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More powerful computers, the better availability of micro-data, and the development of new 
modeling techniques, such as multi-agent systems, allows to analyze agricultural policies from 
the bottom up. We present such an approach that considers the spatial interaction of thousands of 
individually behaving heterogeneous farms and apply it to analyze agri-environmental policies 
for a selected intensive production region in the southwest of Germany.  
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1 Introduction  
At the end of 2000 it was revealed that BSE is much more prevalent in the European Union's 
agriculture than previously assumed. The public recognition of the widespread led to a major 
collapse of the beef market. For instance, in Germany, in a first reaction the demand for beef 
immediately declined by about 50 percent. Moreover, because of BSE many third countries 
banned EU beef imports. In response, the EU Commission initiated a program to destroy 500 
000 tons of beef. This program was one of the impulses that led to severe discussions about the 
future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Apart from the ethical question of food de-
struction, severe doubts about the logic of the CAP arose. In particular, it was questioned how 
a situation could emerge in which enormous amounts of money have to be spend on destroying 
food that previously was produced by the payment of high subsidies.  
Another major criticism concerned what is sometimes called the "industrialization" of agricul-
tural production. The public, i.e. consumers and voters, realized that modern farmers do not 
feed their animals exclusively with crops grown on their own fields, but additionally with 
cheap fodder bought on the world market, with by-products of the food industry, and with meat 
and bonemeal. Since the latter, i.e. meat and bonemeal, is also held responsible for the wide-
spread of BSE, the argument was brought up to create stronger incentives for farmers to grow 
their own food. Therefore, a number of politicians (among them the German Federal Minister 
of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture) proposed to subsidize grassland farming and to 
reduce direct transfer payments to those farmers who operate with animal densities that would 
require a higher fodder input than what can be supplied the farms' own crops. It is argued that 
these measures create incentives for farmers to reorganize production. In order to receive direct 
payments, farms with a high animal density are assumed to develop strategies to diversify and 
reduce their animal density by renting additional land or by reducing the number of animals. 
However, farms that are already very specialized in e.g. pig or poultry production may also 
respond inversely: If such a farm has no chance to increase its acreage because additional land 
is only available at enormous prices and if the reduction of animals is not attractive, it no 
longer may be interested in farming land at all because it would have to farm the land without 2
subsidies. Instead of diversifying, the farm may reduce its acreage and become exclusively 
engaged in animal production.  
Both strategies, i.e. diversification and specialization, affect the land market and, reciprocally, 
the relative attractiveness of these strategies will depend on other farms' behavior and thus on 
the existing farm structure. Hence, for regions with a low animal density, it can be expected 
that farms with intensive animal production will increase their acreage. Because in these re-
gions only a few farms are concerned about the policy change, the adjustment has little impact 
on the land market. On the other hand, in regions with many farms specialized in pig or poultry 
production the situation will be much more complicated. For some regions in Germany - par-
ticularly in the north-west, and similar regions in The Netherlands -, the regional animal den-
sity is even higher than the proposed limit of two livestock units per hectare.
1 In such regions 
the policy impact on the land market is expected to be strong. Then only some farms will fol-
low the strategy of diversification while others will have to specialize.  
The intention of this paper is to analyze the effects of such a policy switching for a region with 
a large number of intensive livestock farms. The region of "Hohenlohe" located in the South-
western German Federal State of Baden-Württemberg displays such characteristics. Apart from 
intensive hog finishing, and turkey production, there are also a number of dairy, farrowing, and 
crop farms present in the region. Farm sizes are relatively small and below the average in West 
Germany. The dominating organizational form is that of a family farm.  
To tackle the problem of how farms interact, the study is based on multi-agent simulations. 
This means, we simulate the adjustment process with a spatial and dynamic model that consid-
ers approximately 2500 heterogeneous, individually behaving farms. These farms are spatially 
distributed in a region with a size of about 75000 ha of agricultural land. Since data for 2500 
individual farms is not available, the model was fitted to the agricultural sector in Hohenlohe 
on the basis of data from a small number of real farms operating in the region. These selected 
farms can be considered typical for the region. The initial farm structure is determined by as-
signing a certain frequency to each of the selected typical farms. These frequencies are chosen 
in order to minimize quadratic differences between the model and the real region with regard to 
several key characteristics (cf. Balmann/Lotze/Noleppa 1998 a,b).  
                                                            
1  A livestock unit (LU) is defined as an animal with a living weight of 500 kg, i.e. a cow is 1.2 LU and a sow is 
0.3 LU. 3
In the remainder of this paper we present the idea of multi-agent modeling as well as the ap-
plied model's general structure, we inform about the region and how the model is calibrated. 
Thereafter, we present alternative policy scenarios and the simulation results with respect to 
structural change, efficiency, and farmers' incomes. Finally, we draw conclusions with regard 
to policy impacts as well as with regard to the applied approach. 
2 Multi-agent systems 
Multi-agent systems (MAS) (e.g. Ferber 1999, Franklin/Graesser 1996) consist of a number of 
interacting autonomous entities which are understood as agents. Russell/Norvig (1995, page 
33) have defined agents as follows:  
"An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors 
and acting upon that environment through effectors." 
This is a very general definition. Accordingly, agents may be persons, computer programs, or 
even thermostats. In a more differentiated way, Franklin/Graesser (1996) characterize agents 
according to their properties (table 1). Some properties are common to all agents. Agents are 
reactive, they act autonomously, are goal-oriented, and agents steadily sense certain parts of 
their environment. In addition, agents may have some particular properties, like the ability to 
communicate with other agents, learning, mobility, and flexibility. They may even have a par-
ticular personality and show emotions. 
Table 1: Classification of agents (Franklin/Graesser 1996) 
Property  Meaning 
reactive  responds in a timely fashion to changes in the environment 
autonomous  exercises control over its own actions 
goal-oriented  does not simply act in response to the environment 
temporally continuous  is a continuously running process 
communicative  communicates with other agents, perhaps including people 
learning (adaptive)  changes its behavior based on its previous experience 
mobile  able to transport itself from one machine to another 
flexible  actions are not scripted 
character  believable "personality" and emotional state 
 4
To illustrate some instances of MAS in economics, table 2 presents a classification and exam-
ples of MAS. Accordingly, there are two main fields of applications: operations research and 
systems analysis. Regarding the first field of application, a number of techniques has been de-
veloped to solve complex optimization problems, like artificial neural nets and cellular auto-
mata. Because most of these techniques have become standard in operations research they will 
not be explained here in detail. We just want to point out, that these techniques are based on 
the interaction of numerous units that can be classified as agents. 
Table 2: Classification and examples of multi-agent systems 










































More interesting for the purpose of this paper is the use of MAS in applied systems analysis. 
Here a number of rather prominent examples can be found in the economics literature. They 
can be classified according to the behavioral foundation of the agents. For instance, Schelling 
(1978) studied the migration dynamics of a spatial neighborhood of individuals belonging to 
different social classes. In Schelling's model, individuals stay or move according to certain 
rules that represent particular preferences. The model is able to show how social clusters or 
even 'ghettos' may evolve as a result of segregation phenomena. Another prominent example of 
such rule-based MAS are Axelrod's (1984) computer tournaments. In these experiments a 
number of computer programs played an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game against each other. 
These experiments led Axelrod to the famous result that a strategy called TIT FOR TAT which 
is mainly based on reciprocity is highly successful in repeated social dilemma games.  
Although rule-based agents can have empirical and theoretical support, they often lack a direct 
economic rationale. More sophisticated are agents with a normative behavioral foundation. A 
very early example of a normative MAS in agricultural economics - even though in those days 5
it was not called a MAS - can be seen in the recursive programming approach developed by 
Day (1963) that considers a number of interacting farms, each representing a particular farm 
type. A fundamental extension of this approach can be found in Balmann (1997). In this ap-
proach - which will be presented in some detail in the following section - an agricultural region 
is represented as a spatial grid with each cell representing a parcel of land. Farms are located 
on some of these parcels. The farms aim for income maximization and compete on a rental 
market for land. Each farm can engage in different production and investment activities, rent 
land, employ additional labor etc. Moreover, new farms can be founded and existing farms can 
close down. Originally, this approach was used to study endogenous structural change (Bal-
mann 1997, 1999). 
A further in theoretical applications very popular conception of a behavioral foundation of in-
dividuals in MAS is to derive individual behavior using methods of artificial intelligence. For 
instance, Arifovic (1994) studies the dynamics of a Cobweb model in which a number of pro-
ducers (a population of agents) determines their output by using a genetic algorithm (GA), 
which can be described as a very simple MAS. In the search for solutions to a problem, GA 
employ the basic operators of biological evolution: selection, recombination (crossover) and 
mutation, which are applied repeatedly to a population of genomes, each representing a possi-
ble solution. These genetic operators not only determine how solutions are propagated into the 
next generation, they are also capable of generating new, possibly superior solutions. In Ari-
fovic's study, the GA is able to successfully identify the Cobweb-equilibrium. Apart from mar-
ket analyses, GA have also been used to study game theoretic problems (e.g. Dawid 1996, Ax-
elrod 1997). Axelrod (1997) applied GA to study iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. In Ax-
elrod’s study GA generated strategies that show key elements of the famous TIT FOR TAT 
strategy which proved to be most successful in his 1984 computer tournaments. Balmann 
(1998) and Balmann/Happe (2000) apply GA to a spatial land market. Both studies come to the 
conclusion that (under comparative-static conditions) limited market access has some distribu-
tive effects if it is compared to situations with unlimited access to the land market. Oligopolis-
tic behavior however is limited to very restrictive conditions. 
Although a number of interesting applications of MAS exists, one may still ask, what is so par-
ticular about them. The first point is that these approaches are very flexible with regard to the 
parameter settings of a model. On the level of the individual agent it is possible to consider 6
bounded rationality, heterogeneous goals and skills. Moreover, as for the model's framework, 
one can consider non-convex functions and imperfect markets. The main reason for the flexi-
bility with respect to assumptions is that the use of relatively small decentralized decision mak-
ing processes avoids that the required computing resources increase unacceptably with an in-
creased model size and complexity, i.e. MAS reduce problems of NP-completeness. The dis-
advantage however is that such MAS do not ensure global optimization and hence they are, for 
instance, not in accordance with the conception of unbounded rationality.
 Rosser (1999) even 
argues that bounded rationality is inevitable in complex models. A second point is that MAS 
allow for self-organization phenomena such as particular emergent structures like flocking 
birds or a laser beam. These self-organization phenomena include not just complex structures 
but also complex dynamics; dynamics that may include for instance persistent states far from 
equilibrium and multiple-phase dynamics (cf. Day 1995, Day/Walters 1995). Last but not least 
MAS allow in a very direct way the consideration of space, and hence they are virtually 
predestinated for agricultural and environmental research. 
3 The model 
Imagine taking a bird’s-eye view on an idealized agricultural region in which land is divided 
into parcels of a fixed size like on a chessboard. The region consists of about 30 000 quadratic 
plots of 2.5 ha each, i.e. the region's size is about 75 000 ha. To avoid border effects, the region 
is assumed to form a torus, i.e., plots at a border are assumed to be immediate neighbors of 
plots at the opposite side of the grid. Land is heterogeneous with respect to spatial ordering and 
quality. Two qualities are considered: land for arable farming and grassland. Initially, a total 
number of 2606 family farms operates in this region. The parcels on which the farmsteads are 
located are surrounded by a highlighted border. Each parcel managed by a particular farm has 
the same color as the interior of the farmstead. Then, this agricultural region may look similar 
to figure 1.
2 
                                                            
2  An earlier version of the model is presented in much more detail in Balmann (1997).  7
 
Figure 1: Usage structure
3  
The farms have to be understood as agents. Each of them acts autonomously in order to maxi-
mize the expected individual household income. They can engage in 13 different agricultural 
production activities (e.g. dairy, cattle, hogs, sows, arable farming, pasture land) and they can 
invest in 28 different assets (differently sized buildings for various activities, machinery of 
different sizes). These investment alternatives allow for some economies of size, i.e. with in-
creasing size, labor can be used more effectively and average acquisition costs per unit de-
crease. For instance - and in accordance with a number of empirical studies (Kirschke et al. 
1998, Helmcke 1995, Peter 1993) -, it is considered that in crop production, economies of scale 
exist up to a size of some 250 ha. In addition to the different production and investment activi-
ties, the farms can use their labor and capital for off-farm employment as well as they are al-
lowed to hire in additional labor and to make debts. Additional land can be rented on a pure 
rental market and parcels can be disposed to the rental market. Farms can give up farming and, 
in principal, new farms can be founded.  
                                                            
3  For display reasons only a tenth of the actual simulated region is shown here. 8
Although all farms act autonomously and can evolve heterogeneously in many variables (e.g. 
equity capital, liquidity, debts, asset structure, rental contracts) they all follow the same deci-
sion rules and expectations. All decision making routines are based on adaptive expectations. 
Production and investment activities are optimized by mixed-integer linear programming. If a 
farm invests, this has an impact on the farm's production capacities for the lifetime of the asset 
(machinery: 12 periods; buildings: 20 - 25 periods), i.e. the investment costs are considered to 
be sunk. The same holds for the capital stock that depends on previous investments as well as 
on previously gained profits. A farm closes down if it is either illiquid or if the farm's expected 
profit does not cover the opportunity costs of the factors owned by the farm-household.  
Summarizing, on the micro level, each farm's decision making is defined in a way that can be 
called myopic or bounded rational. Although the farms are rather smart with regard to the ap-
plied optimizations techniques, the farmer's cognitive abilities are limited. For instance, farms 
are not able to communicate with their neighbors and hence they are not able to use machines 
jointly or to merge. Moreover, they are not able to behave strategically. On the aggregate level, 
the model can be understood as a complex distributed recursive programming approach that is 
simulated for a number of periods. In each period, all farms have to decide simultaneously on 
investments, renting land, and production activities. For computational reasons the farms' deci-




































Figure 2: Flowchart of the program (according to Balmann, 1997) 9
The farms are linked together via product markets and several local markets for inputs: arable 
land and grassland, milk quotas, and manure. Particularly relevant are the land markets, since a 
farm can increase its acreage only if there either is idle land which is momentarily farmed by 
another farm or if other farms reduce their acreage and release land to the land market. The 
allocation of free land takes place in two iterative parallel auctions (arable land and pasture 
land) during which farms make offers according to their marginal productivity of land and their 
transportation costs to the next available parcel. All offers are compared and the farm with the 
highest bid receives the plot it wishes. Then all farms compute their offers again. These are 
compared again and so on. The auction stops when there is no more land available or if there 
are no positive offers. The actual rent paid for newly allocated plots in a particular period is 
determined on the basis of the offer given for this plot and the average offer for all other plots 
newly rented in that period. The rent paid for all other plots which were not newly rented in 
this period are iteratively adjusted towards the average price of newly rented plots. 
The farms are also affected by developments on product markets. Product prices may change 
according to regional production activities. However, because only a small region is simulated, 
it is assumed that the gross margins of the main activities are fixed. For the simulations pre-
sented in the remainder, technical progress is ignored.
4  
As already mentioned, it is assumed that the acquisition costs of assets are totally sunk after an 
investment has been made, i.e. the opportunity costs of assets are zero. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that each farm is handed over randomly to the next generation every 25th period. Then, 
for the decision whether or not to continue farming, the opportunity costs of farm-household 
labor are considered to be 15% higher. If the farm continues, opportunity costs for off-farm use 
of labor remain at the lower level, since this is understood as an investment into agricultural 
training which reduces the chance of a profitable off-farm employment.  
4 Calibration and data 
Unlike the model approach presented in Balmann (1997, 1999, 2001) in which a fictitious, hy-
pothetical region was modeled, the present approach models the agricultural structure of an 
existing region. In particular, the following simulations try to capture agri-environmental pol-
                                                            
4 A more realistic approach would probably be to consider increasing opportunity costs for labor and to incorpo-
rate technological progress. For an explicit consideration of technical progress cf. Berger (2001). 10
icy impacts on the selected region of Hohenlohe. For this, in a first step, the model is calibrated 
in order to consider the central characteristics of agricultural production in Hohenlohe. The 
calibration occurs on two levels: the farm level and the aggregate level.  
On the farm level, 12 different basic farm types are defined. These are defined on the basis of 
data from 12 real farms in Hohenlohe, each of which takes part in the German Farm Accoun-
tancy Data Network (FADN). The main selection criterion was that the farms should be typical 
for the region, i.e. they should be able to cover Hohenlohe's range of farm types with respect to 
size, main production area, and whether it is a full-time or part-time farm. Table 1 gives an 
overview. Accordingly, 8 full-time and 4 part-time farms were chosen. Among them are dairy 
farms, pig farms, poultry farms, crop farms and mixed farms of different farm sizes. The farms 
operate with selected production techniques that are considered to be typical for the region. 
The required coefficients regarding investment alternatives, LP/MIP matrices, and the calcula-
tions of gross margins and profits are derived from standard farm management data samples 
published for the German agriculture (KTBL 1997, Landesanstalt fuer Landwirtschaft 2001, 
Regierungsbezirk Mittelfranken 2001). 
Table 3: Characteristics and frequencies of the specified basic farms 
Variable  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L 
Organization                         
crop          X  X          X   
dairy      X  X          X       
pig, poultry  X  X            X        X 
mixed              X      X     
full-time  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X         
part-time                  X  X  X  X 
Land                         
total (ha)  22.5  72.5  67.5  30  37.5  60  50  112.5  12.5  17.5  10  20 
arable (ha)  22.5  72.5  40  12.5  37.5  60  22.5  102.5  5  12.5  10  20 
pasture (ha)  0  0  27.5  17.5      27.5  10  7.5  5  0  0 
Animals                         
cattle      90  52      63  25  28  5     
cows      39  26      28    12       
sows  40  128      40    64  170        128 
hogs  300  600            0    100     
turkeys            20000             
Frequency  480  25  120  244  106  22  231  95  389  154  442  298 
 
As the last row of table 3 shows, each of the specified typical farms is assigned a certain fre-
quency. The frequencies are determined in order to receive a farm structure that reflects the 11
main characteristics of the regional agriculture on the aggregate level. These aggregate charac-
teristics are the number of farms (total and with respect to specialization and size), the amount 
of hectares of arable land and of pasture land, the land used by farms with a certain organiza-
tion and specialization, and the number of animals (dairy cows, sows, hogs, turkeys). Table 4 
shows the obtained adjustment with respect to the selected characteristics.  
Table 4: Adjustment of the model with respect to main characteristics of Hohenlohe 
Variable  Units  Hohenlohe  Model  Error 
Farms         
total  farms  3013  2606  -14% 
crops  farms  459  570  + 24% 
dairy  farms  906  753  -17% 
pigs, poultry  farms  988  898  -9% 
mixed  farms  516  385  -25% 
full-time  farms  1578  1323  -16% 
part-time  farms  1435  1283  -11% 
Land         
total  ha  72448  73503  +1% 
arable  ha  55043  54943  0 
pasture  ha  17405  18560  +7% 
Land farmed by         
crop farms  ha  9569  9715  +2% 
dairy farms  ha  21683  20283  -6% 
pig, poultry farms  ha  27766  29260  +5% 
mixed farms  ha  14421  14245  -1% 
full-time farms  ha  57464  55565  -3% 
part-time farms  ha  16276  17938  +10% 
Animals         
cattle  animals  60638  51903  +14% 
cows  animals  21072  22361  +6% 
sows  animals  99787  95718  -4% 
hogs  animals  169901  174400  +3% 
turkeys  animals  450000  440000  -2% 
 
Since there is a certain trade-off in fitting the different characteristics, the frequencies have 
been chosen by minimizing the weighted quadratic deviations between the model and the re-
gion. A formal presentation of the calibration procedure can be found in Balmann/Lotze/No-
leppa (1998a and b). According to table 2, the calibrated model fits the selected characteristics 
of the real region quite well. Strong differences only exist with respect to the number of farms. 
This is mainly due to the fact, that there is a sample error in the German FADN. Particularly 
small farms often are not willing to participate and often do not meet the respective criteria for 12
participation. For instance, the smallest farm we found in the FADN for Hohenlohe which ful-
filled the selection criteria had an acreage of some 10 ha. Thus, it was particularly difficult to 
represent the many part-time farms which are often smaller. 
For the initialization of a simulation, each of the basic farms is established in the model region 
according to the determined frequency. However, before a simulation starts, the different basic 
farms are further individualized with respect to several variables. These variables are the loca-
tion on the spatial grid and the age of the farms' machinery and buildings. These variables are 
determined randomly. Moreover each farm receives an individual management coefficient 
which affects the farm's variable costs and thus its profitability and competitiveness. For every 
calculation of gross margins, this coefficient (with a random value between 0.95 and 1.05) is 
multiplied with the relevant variable costs. 
5 Policy scenarios 
As already mentioned, this study aims to analyze the possible impacts of an agricultural policy 
switching towards a policy which favors environmentally friendly production methods, in the 
sense of a stronger link between animal production and land use. We have taken the Agenda 
2000 as the reference scenario for the policy switching. The Agenda 2000 is a political action 
program of the European Union that has been agreed on in 1999 at the Berlin European Coun-
cil Meeting by the heads of government of the respective memberstates. Starting in 2000, the 
program is being implemented successively and - apart from non-agricultural issues, such as to 
give the European Union a new financial framework for the period 2000-2006 - it also deter-
mines a general framework for the CAP.
5 Since the considered switching towards a more envi-
ronmentally oriented agricultural policy will be based on the Agenda 2000, the actual regula-
tions of the Agenda 2000 will have to be taken as the reference scenario. At present the first 
steps of the Agenda 2000, but not the whole program, have been implemented. Consequently, 
the farm structure and the considered farms' organization as they presently can be found in 
Hohenlohe are more the result of former CAP regulations, and not a direct result of Agenda 
2000. In order to overcome this inconsistency, we first define and simulate a base scenario re-
flecting the pre-Agenda policy situation. This scenario is mainly used for calibration and vali-
                                                            
5  The contents of Agenda 2000 can be retrieved under http://europe.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm. 
Several studies analyzing its impacts on German agriculture can be found in Agrarwirtschaft, Vol. 47 (12).  13
dation purposes. During calibration and validation the assumptions of the base model are sub-
ject to adjustments in order to reflect the actual agricultural structure and the main trends of 
Hohenlohe in an acceptable way. After the model has been calibrated the reference scenario - 
the Agenda 2000 - is implemented into the calibrated model, as well as two alternative policy 
scenarios. 
Reference scenario: Agenda 2000 
To obtain an understanding of the policy scenarios to come, we will briefly discuss the key 
aspects of the reference scenario, the Agenda 2000. The central changes as compared to the 
pre-Agenda situation are a reduction of intervention prices for products like cereals, beef, and 
milk. In return farmers receive higher direct payments. With respect to crop farming the pay-
ments depend on the amount of land that is used for the production of cereals, oil seeds, and 
legumes. In dairy farming the payments depend on the milk quota and in beef production on 
the number of animals. Concerning arable crops, intervention prices for cereals are cut by alto-
gether 15%. At the same time, direct payments are increased to 324 € per ha for cereals and 
oilseeds and 383 € per ha for protein seeds. The compulsory set-aside rate is reduced to 10%, 
but voluntary set-aside is possible, and it is compensated for with 324 € per ha. Arrangements 
for silage maize are maintained. 
For beef products intervention prices are cut by 20%. The bull premium is increased to 283 € 
per animal and year. The annual premium for suckler cows is increased to 215 € per cow. All 
animals beyond an overall stocking density of two livestock units per hectare of forage area, 
including bulls, dairy and suckler cows, are not eligible for premia. For dairy products inter-
vention prices are cut by 15 percent. Milk quotas are maintained at current levels. A new direct 
payment is introduced at 215 € per dairy "premium unit" per year, including the beef pre-
mium.
6 
Alternative scenario I: Limiting the livestock density 
The first alternative scenario ("LU-Agenda") is directly based on the reference scenario of the 
Agenda 2000. The only modification is the assumption that a farm is only eligible to receive 
the full amount of direct payments if the farm's livestock density is below two livestock units 
                                                            
6 A "premium unit" is defined as a dairy cow with an EU-average milk yield of 5 800 kg per year. 14
(LU) per ha of farmland.
7 If not, it is assumed that the payments are cut by 162 € for each LU 
that is above the farm's limit of 2 LU times the land which is farmed. 
Alternative scenario II: Unitary premium for all grassland and limited livestock density 
The second alternative scenario ("LU-Premium") also considers the limited livestock density. 
Moreover, instead of the rather differentiated payments for different crops, it is considered that 
the farms receive a unitary payment of 250 € per ha of land, regardless of how the land is 
farmed. The payments for animals are those of the reference scenario. 
6 Results 
6.1 Base scenario and Agenda 2000 
Before, the policy scenarios will be analyzed, we will first look at the base scenario and the 
reference scenario, i.e. the Agenda 2000. In particular, we will illustrate the adjustment of the 
model with respect to structure and structural change. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the av-
erage farm size for the base scenario and the Agenda 2000. Accordingly farm sizes develop 
steadily and rather slowly. For the base run, the average annual growth rate is 2.9% which is 
similar to the real development in West Germany, where average farm sizes increased from 
1991 to 2000 with a rate of 3.2% per year. The model growth rate is slightly lower because 
technical progress has not (yet) been considered in the model. Compared to the base run, the 
Agenda 2000 will slightly speed up structural change (3.2%). This can be explained by a 
reduction in subsidies, i.e. the higher direct payments do not fully compensate price reductions. 
As a consequence, more farms with a low productivity leave the sector, as compared to the 
base run.
8 This however does not mean that the Agenda causes persistently lower incomes. As 
figure 4 shows, profits develop closely together. After about 5 periods, the Agenda 2000 leads 
to equal profits. The explanation can be found in the faster structural change and – this is more 
relevant - in significantly lower rental prices for land which after period 5 compensate for the 
lower subsidies. This positive impact on incomes is also illustrated by figure 5 which shows 
the average rental prices and economic land rents. The economic land rent is computed as the 
household income plus rent expenditures minus long-run opportunity costs of the capital and 
                                                            
7  One livestock unit (LU) is defined as an animal with a living weight of 500 kg 
8  Regarding a quantification of the effects cf. Balmann/Lotze/Noleppa (1998b). 15
family labor. Even though economic land rents are lower for the Agenda 2000, after some pe-
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Figure 5: Evolution of rental prices for land and land rents 16
What is remarkable about figure 5 is the fact that for the entire time horizon of 20 periods eco-
nomic land rents are below rental prices for land; for several periods they are even negative. 
On first glance this may surprise, because it implies a persistent disequilibrium. But, since ini-
tially farms are very small, hardly any farm is able to exploit increasing returns to scale. Many 
farms only continue farming because the costs of their assets are sunk and their opportunity 
costs of farm-household labor are low. If in figure 5 depreciation would be ignored, i.e. 
depreciations would be added to land rents, the sum would be above rental prices. Hence one 
can argue that even within a time horizon of two decades the sector is not able to adjust fully 
towards a state that fulfils central equilibrium conditions, in which prices cover long run costs.
9 
Summarizing, it can be concluded that in response to the Agenda 2000 farms have to adjust. 
But, the adjustment induced by Agenda 2000 policies turns out to be not much stronger than 
the adjustments that would happened in any case without the Agenda 2000 (base run). This is 
due to the fact that West German farms in general, and farms in Hohenlohe in particular, have 
to be considered as too small. Hence, adjustment pressure towards a larger farm structure is 
immanent to the farm structure. Concluding, it can be noted that the reference scenario defines 
a "state" that is far from equilibrium.  
6.2 The switching costs of alternative policy scenarios 
After having sketched the actual situation of the agricultural sector in Hohenlohe in the previ-
ous section, we will now focus on the two alternative policy scenarios defined above, both of 
which require farms to meet certain livestock densities in order to be eligible for direct pay-
ments. Results of these alternative scenarios will not only be analyzed on a sector level (which 
considers only averages), but a more detailed analyses on the farm level will be carried out to 
illustrate the policy response of different farm types as well as interactions between farms.  
Unlike the base run and the Agenda 2000 scenario, on the aggregate level, the alternative pol-
icy scenarios show to have a strong effect on the structural adjustment process. For instance, 
the scenario Agenda 2000 with limited livestock density ("LU-Agenda 2000") fosters structural 
change with respect to average farm size. Obviously, farms initially exceeding the limit of 2 
LU/ha with their existing production capacities, aim at increasing their acreage in order to fur-
ther fully utilize their production capacities.  
                                                            
9  A more detailed analysis of this equilibrium can be found in Balmann (1999). 17
This is somewhat different for the scenario with a fixed premium for land use ("LU-Premium") 
which shows to inhibit the increase in farm sizes. This can be explained by the fact that many 
small dairy farms benefit from fixed grassland premia, which were not granted as part of 
Agenda 2000. Thus the competitiveness of these dairy farms on the land market increases as 
compared to less grassland-dependent farms (pig and poultry farms, crop farms). Conse-
quently, more farms survive and the average acreage remains smaller. This is supported by 
figure 7 which shows the land shares of different farm size classes. Accordingly, the scenario 
"LU-Premium" allows many small farms with 10 to 20 ha, the majority of which are small 
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Figure 8: Livestock densities per farm and period  
Nevertheless, the livestock limit on livestock density is very effective in both alternative sce-
narios. According to figure 8 the majority of farms chooses to actually limit their livestock 19
density to a level below 2 LU/ha in all periods. There are only a few exceptions, where it is 
more profitable for the farm to accept the levy of 160 € per LU. 
Thus the initial thesis that the limit may cause inverse responses by some farms is not con-
firmed, i.e. farms do not lay off all land and specialize exclusively on animal production. 
Moreover, the average livestock density on the regional level declines from about 1.8 LU/ha to 
1.3 LU/ha. Thus, it can be concluded that such a policy will also reduce other environmental 
problems related to high local concentration of animal production, such as the intense use of 
















Figure 9: Evolution of livestock densities 
After having shown that the alternative policy scenarios are indeed effective with respect to 
their aspired goal to reduce livestock density, it has to be asked at what costs this happens. A 
first point of interest is the impact on farm incomes. Figure 10 shows that for both scenarios 
incomes develop below the reference scenario "Agenda 2000". The income reduction of "LU-
Agenda 2000" amounts to about 1200 € per year and farm, i.e. a reduction of 4.4%, and the 
income of "LU-Premium" is about 2200 € per year and farm lower, which corresponds to a 
reduction of 8%. On first glance this may not appear to be a strong income effect. Neverthe-
less, three aspects are worth mentioning: Firstly, it should be considered that in case of "LU-
Agenda 2000" much more farms are driven out of the sector. Secondly, the average farm in-
come is already rather low in the reference scenario, i.e. as figure 5 shows, the economic land 
rent is lower than the rental prices and thus there is a kind of functional income disparity (cf. 
Balmann 1999). And thirdly, one should consider that the farms are affected very heterogene-20
ously by policy switchings. While some farms may even benefit, the profits of other farms may 















Figure 10: Evolution of average profits per farm 
Table 5: Adjustment of the model with respect to main characteristics of Hohenlohe 
Initial farm types I D C K F E B A L G H J
Reference
number [%] 31% 44% 65% 57% 69% 91% 85% 95% 99% 85% 100% 78%
size [ha] 28.80 33.05 59.99 23.81 87.15 45.21 71.71 30.95 24.44 58.94 110.28 28.67
income [€] 32010 34287 38494 30737 24151 59016 33054 23843 45053 54437 85891 31923
profit [€] 19895 27687 31699 13872 14632 38987 25293 14049 27141 43667 57134 13489
livestock [LU/ha] 2.56 2.30 1.29 1.20 1.86 1.60 1.55 1.66 2.09 1.95 0.90 1.61
Scenario 1
number [%] 23% 47% 62% 47% 54% 86% 71% 95% 78% 86% 100% 70%
size [ha] 26.49 38.60 61.81 21.78 71.32 51.04 73.08 35.45 32.03 63.50 105.80 31.01
income [€] 31723 34428 37401 30536 15844 58968 28217 22978 42823 53354 81991 30928
profit [€] 14082 25945 31188 9206 3975 35051 21067 13417 26889 40888 51630 10986
rel. change [%] -29% -6% -2% -34% -73% -10% -17% -4% -1% -6% -10% -19%
livestock [LU/ha] 1.91 1.75 1.30 0.48 3.36 1.00 1.25 1.35 1.58 1.58 0.82 1.22
Scenario 2
number [%] 50% 74% 91% 50% 49% 85% 67% 94% 77% 94% 99% 89%
size [ha] 20.88 39.17 64.55 13.91 51.48 46.02 64.07 28.97 28.86 66.33 94.86 20.90
income [€] 35135 38124 42221 30293 11358 57281 27273 22897 41524 58927 77991 32456
profit [€] 13683 27681 35463 6464 -320 31453 19649 12019 25453 46152 49522 9441
rel. change [%] -31% 0% 12% -53% -102% -19% -22% -14% -6% 6% -13% -30%
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The income effects for the two scenarios depend on several factors. One is the initial reduction 
of subsidies. But, as figure 11 shows, transfer payments in the alternative scenarios are only 
temporarily below the reference scenario. Whereas transfer payments in the reference scenario 
show a decreasing trend in the first periods, this is the reverse in the case of the alternative sce-
narios. There are different reasons for this development: As for the reference scenario the 
transfer payments are declining because of structural adjustments mainly by dairy farms that 21
close down, sell their milk quotas, and leave the sector. Even though the assumed quota price 
with an annual opportunity costs of 0.05 € per kg is rather low, quota leaves the region and 
therefore direct payments for dairy cows decline. In the case of the alternative scenarios trans-
fer payments initially are lower, but only after a few periods, farms have adjusted their farm 
organization such as to meet the payment criteria and hence there is no difference between the 
reference and the "LU-Agenda 2000" scenario. The scenario "LU-Premium" after 3 periods 

















Figure 11: Evolution of average transfer payments per ha 
Apart from the amount of transfer payments, the profits depend on the relation of productivity 
and land rents. According to figure 12, the policies affect both land rents and rental prices. Un-
der Agenda 2000 conditions the limitation of the livestock density ("LU-Agenda") leads to a 
reduction of land rents during the first 10 periods as well as to an increase in rental prices. Be-
cause animal production capacities are fixed in the short run, the affected farms attempt to in-
crease their acreage with the effect that rental prices increase irrespective of the fact that a 
number of farms receive lower transfer payments and thus have lower land rents. Since already 
in the starting situation about 50% of the agricultural land is rented land, this leads to smaller 
profits. What is remarkable about this situation is that after about 10 periods economic land 
rents are higher for the "LU-Agenda" scenario than for the reference scenario Agenda 2000 
without livestock restrictions. A reasonable explanation for this is the productivity impact of a 
faster structural change. Since more farms with a low productivity leave the sector, the remain-
ing farms perform better. However, this is not free of charge: Some farms close down despite 
of buildings that could still be used and and despite of low opportunity costs of their labor. If 
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Figure 12: Evolution of rental prices for land and land rents 
7 Summary and conclusions 
Summarizing the results, one can conclude that the impacts of a main policy switching occurs 
on very different levels. If farms are heterogeneous they are affected individually and respond 
very differently. This can even mean that more restrictive policies may have positive impacts 
on some farms while other farms may suffer badly. The alternative policy scenarios presented 
above fall into this category. A policy that requires farms to meet certain animal density crite-
ria in order to receive transfer payments can be quite effective because it creates the "right" 
incentives - provided that the requested animal densities follow the "right" goal. However, this 
is not free of charge. Particularly in livestock production, adjustment costs can be very high 
and adjustments occur slowly. On the one hand this is due to sunk costs, as illustrated above. 
On the other hand - and this has not been considered in this study - adjustments in livestock 
production often require farmers to learn about and quickly implement new and different pro-
duction technologies. How time-consuming this may be can be seen from the transition of East 
German agriculture. Even 10 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the successors of former 23
collective farms increase their physical productivity in animal production at enormous rates 
which cannot reflect normal technological progress but still a catch-up process towards what is 
technologically possible (Balmann/Czasch/Odening 2001).  
Thus, from a policy perspective, one has to conclude that policy switchings that affect animal 
production should either be introduced slowly or should be announced in due time such that 
farmers can respond without enormous adjustment costs. But, since policies often reflect spon-
taneous reactions to public concerns, this often is not the case. From a scientific and from a 
modeling perspective, one has to conclude that the simulations presented above give a starting 
point for further investigations. Even though the model is already very differentiated regarding 
individualization as well as regarding dynamic and spatial issues, many promising extensions 
are not yet implemented: One may additionally consider technological progress, more differen-
tiated landscapes, heterogeneous preferences of farmers, etc. Moreover, the model may be ap-
plied to different regions and alternative market scenarios.  
The presented simulations are based on a model approach that has been developed originally to 
analyze the particular dynamics of structural change. On the basis of this intention it allows to 
study long term policy effects. The obtained results shed some light on policy effects that often 
are ignored by conventional policy analysis, such as dynamical and distributional impacts on 
efficiency and incomes. From this point of view, policy modeling on the basis of multi-agent 
systems seems very promising. On the other hand, the question is, how valid and how convinc-
ing the model and its results are from the politicians' and economists' perspectives. And indeed, 
there are some critical points: 
• Firstly, one has to concede that the validation of such models is difficult. Neither it is pos-
sible to recalculate all numbers, nor is it possible to compare the results directly with ana-
lytical and empirical results. Nevertheless - and this is demonstrated by earlier applications 
of the approach (Balmann 1999, 2000) -, the results are surprisingly robust and did not 
change significantly during many revisions the model was undergoing over the past eight 
years. Moreover, the results fit many empirical observations like slow structural change, 
persistently unexploited economies of scale, and income disparities very well. 
• Secondly, several of the model's assumptions (like the existence of bounded rationality 
and economies of scale) and results (like path dependence and income disparities) are dis-24
cussed very controversially in agricultural economics. Hence one may criticize that the 
model and its applications may only convince those people who are already persuaded of 
bounded rationality and increasing returns. A critic may argue that the model simulations 
just reflect what has been put into the model. But, this argument is too short-sighted. If the 
model's assumptions and results are in line with a particular economic argumentation this 
does not mean that it is trivial. Phenomena like bounded rationality, increasing returns, 
path dependence, and income disparities imply complexity and can often hardly be tackled 
analytically. Then the only opportunity is either numerical simulation or verbal and quali-
tative reasoning. The advantage of numerical simulations is that simulations allow to quan-
tify the effects and to check the consistency of the argumentation. Herewith they enable to 
find inconsistencies of the argumentation and to improve the theoretical arguments. They 
may even allow to develop hypotheses which enable promising empirical tests. 
• Thirdly, MAS are usually highly-dimensional and non-linear. Even for the user it is diffi-
cult to grasp the full structure of the results regarding their variability over the different 
agents and over time. Hence, it is far from trivial to mediate the model's assumptions and 
its results to third persons. Every presentation requires simplification and it may even oc-
cur that the more differentiated and sophisticated the presentation is, the more questions 
arise for the addressees. In the end, the analysis and presentation of the model results may 
require simplified models of the original model and its results. Sometimes it may even be 
useful to apply sophisticated statistical methods to study the simulations' results. For in-
stance, Balmann/Hilbig (1998) applied a factor analysis and a cluster analysis to study 
conditions under which the presented model shows path dependent behavior. 
Summarizing these points, it is clear that there are some problems with the use of complex 
MAS. But actually these problems should rather be understood as a matter of the research 
questions to which MAS are applied than one of the method itself. It is reality which is so 
complex. Models based on MAS allow just to consider and reflect this complexity. Hence, to 
renounce this method means often not to use a method that is able to grasp the complexity of 
the research question. Moreover, MAS have to be understood as a rather young field of re-
search. The application of MAS allows to explore their opportunities and to learn about them. 
This is a valuable byproduct of a method which is a beneficiary of the increasing power of 25
modern computers. The limits of such models are far from reached and they are steadily shifted 
further.  
To conclude, MAS offer the opportunity to look at economic and social processes from new 
and different perspectives. They allow to study questions which otherwise cannot be tackled at 
all or which require rather strong assumptions. Hence, MAS appear to be a promising tool for 
policy research. Their limitations will depend on the progress in information technology and on 
the resourcefulness of its users. Thus they are also a promising field of future research.  
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